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Team Production Theory Across the
Waves
Brian R. Cheffins *
Richard Williams **
ABSTRACT
Team production theory, which Margaret Blair developed in tandem
with Lynn Stout, has had a major impact on corporate law scholarship. The
team production model, however, has been applied sparingly outside the United
States. This article, part of a symposium honoring Margaret Blair’s
scholarship, serves as a partial corrective by drawing on team production theory
to assess corporate arrangements in the United Kingdom. Even though Blair
and Stout are dismissive of “shareholder primacy” and the U.K. is thought of
as a “shareholder-friendly” jurisdiction, deploying team production theory
sheds light on key corporate law topics such as directors’ duties and the
allocation of managerial authority. In particular, the case study offered here
shows that board centrality—a key element of team production thinking—
features prominently in U.K. corporate governance despite Britain’s
shareholder-oriented legal framework. The case study also draws attention to
the heretofore neglected role that private ordering can play in the development
of team production-friendly governance arrangements.
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INTRODUCTION
Among Margaret Blair’s many distinguished contributions to
the related fields of corporate law and corporate governance, she is best
known for her work on team production theory. 1 The team production
model of corporate law debuted in a 1999 Virginia Law Review article
Blair coauthored with Lynn Stout. 2 They characterized the board of
directors as a “mediating hierarchy” tasked with balancing the interests
of a corporation’s various constituencies in a manner that would
address the challenges associated with fostering productive activity
requiring combined investment and coordinated effort, i.e., team
production. 3 The theory’s impact on corporate law scholarship has been
substantial. Blair and Stout’s 1999 article was described in 2014 as “one
of the most important corporate law articles of the past twenty-five
years,” 4 and it is one of the ten most-cited corporate and securities law

1.
According to Google Scholar, Margaret Blair’s most frequently cited academic publication
is Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV.
247 (1999). This cornerstone of her research on team production had been cited 2,651 times as of
mid-November 2021, compared with 2,636 times for her 1995 book, MARGARET M. BLAIR,
OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY (1995). Given that Blair wrote about team production theory subsequently on numerous
occasions—see infra notes 10–11—it is fair to say that she is best known for her work on team
production theory.
2.
Blair & Stout, supra note 1.
3.
Id. at 305–06.
4.
David Millon, Team Production Theory: A Critical Appreciation, 62 UCLA L. REV.
DISCOURSE 79, 79 (2014).
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articles of all time. 5 More generally, their work on team production has
been described as “compelling” 6 and “path-breaking.” 7
When Blair and Stout published A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, comparative analysis was well on the way to becoming
a mainstream approach in corporate governance studies. 8 Nevertheless,
Blair and Stout’s analysis of team production lacked a cross-border
dimension, with an occasional reference to Japanese scholars in
footnotes being the only explicitly foreign content in their 1999 article. 9
Blair and Stout’s approach would remain domestically focused as they
continued to explore team production theory. Other than two mid-2000s
articles published in European journals that lacked specific analysis of
non-American jurisdictions, 10 each of the academic articles where Blair
canvassed team production theory in detail were U.S.-centric pieces
published in American journals. 11
We are not drawing attention to the absence of an explicit
comparative dimension in Margaret Blair’s work on team production to
find fault with her scholarship. Her intellectual contribution remains
undiminished. The point instead is that it falls to others to do the
spadework to assess the insights team production theory can provide
outside the American context. This has indeed already occurred to a

5.
Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most Cited Law Review Articles of All Time, 110
MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1499 (2012) (ranking eighth).
6.
See Peter C. Kostant, Team Production and the Progressive Corporate Law Agenda, 35
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 667, 670 (2002).
7.
Virginia Harper Ho, Team Production & the Multinational Enterprise, 38 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 499, 499 (2015).
8.
See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, Comparative Corporate Governance and
Pedagogy, 34 GA. L. REV. 721, 722 n.1 (2000) (stating that since the early 1990s, comparative
corporate governance had “ ‘growed like Topsy,’ bursting onto center stage in corporate law
scholarship”).
9.
See Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 270 n.47, 286 n.82 (citing, for example, the work of
Masahiko Aoki).
10. See Margaret M. Blair, Institutionalists, Neoclassicals and Team Production, 43 BRIT. J.
INDUS. RELS. 605 (2005); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Specific Investment and Corporate
Law, 7 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 473 (2006). The approach was the same in a chapter in a handbook
with a British publisher—Margaret M. Blair, Corporate Law as a Solution to Team Production
Problems, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE CORPORATION 198 (Thomas Clarke, Justin O’Brien
& Charles R. T. O’Kelley eds., 2019) [hereinafter Corporate Law as a Solution].
11. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role
of the Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 408 (2001) [hereinafter Director Accountability];
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Specific Investment: Explaining Anomalies in Corporate Law,
31 J. CORP. L. 719, 719 (2006) [hereinafter Specific Investment]; Margaret M. Blair, Boards of
Directors as Mediating Hierarchs, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 297, 331 (2015) [hereinafter Mediating
Hierarchs]; Margaret M. Blair, What Must Corporate Directors Do? Maximizing Shareholder Value
Versus Creating Value Through Team Production, BROOKINGS 1 (June 2015) [hereinafter What
Must
Corporate
Directors
Do?],
https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/Blairrevised-61115.pdf [https://perma.cc/7GZC-CXDS].
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limited degree, most prominently with respect to Canada. 12 This Article
travels across the waves of the Atlantic to identify lessons that can be
derived by examining British corporate arrangements through a team
production prism.
The U.K. seems to be a promising candidate for deploying team
production theory on a cross-border basis. British corporate law
academics who have engaged with the theory have been favorably
disposed toward it. 13 Britain and the United States also resemble each
other in ways that are highly relevant to corporate law and corporate
governance. 14 Both are common‐law jurisdictions with strong
judiciaries and well-developed stock markets. Moreover, in both
countries the typical large business enterprise is publicly traded and
lacks a blockholder with sufficient clout to exercise continuous, detailed
oversight of management. Correspondingly, ameliorating managerial
agency costs is a higher priority than limiting misbehavior by
major shareholders.
Drawing on team production theory to assess corporate
arrangements in the U.K. is an exercise that potentially could be either
normative or positive (descriptive) in orientation. Both approaches
feature in Blair and Stout’s team production scholarship. 15 From a
descriptive standpoint, Blair and Stout maintain team production
theory “does much to explain the actual structure of corporate law.” 16
Or as Blair argued in a 2019 chapter offering a synopsis of the theory,
“many of the details of corporate law are consistent with the idea that
a primary function of boards of directors is to mediate among important
competing interests in the corporation and thereby resolve or head
off disputes.” 17
Normatively, Blair and Stout maintain team production
governance is superior on economic grounds to a regime where directors
12. See, e.g., Stephanie Ben-Ishai, A Team Production Theory of Canadian Corporate Law,
44 ALTA. L. REV. 299 (2006); Martin Gelter, The Dark Side of Shareholder Influence: Managerial
Autonomy and Stakeholder Orientation in Comparative Corporate Governance, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J.
129 (2009) (drawing on team production theory as part of a multi-jurisdictional analysis of the
shareholder/stakeholder balance in corporate governance).
13. See infra notes 58–65 and related discussion.
14. See John Armour, Bernard Black, Brian R. Cheffins & Richard Nolan, Private
Enforcement of Corporate Law: An Empirical Comparison of the United Kingdom and the United
States, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDS. 687, 689–90 (2009).
15. See Ben-Ishai, supra note 12, at 303–04; Ian B. Lee, Efficiency and Ethics in the Debate
about Shareholder Primacy, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 533, 541 (2006); Matthew T. Bodie, The PostRevolutionary Period in Corporate Law: Returning to the Theory of the Firm, 35 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 1033, 1052 (2012).
16. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1756 (2001).
17. Blair, Corporate Law as a Solution, supra note 10, at 199.
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prioritize shareholders ahead of other stakeholder groups (“shareholder
primacy”). Corporations, Blair and Stout reason, will be more
productive when directors have substantial discretion available to them
and take advantage of this autonomy to balance judiciously the
interests of all relevant stakeholders rather than seek to maximize
stockholder returns. They say:
From a normative basis, a team production analysis suggests that this is how the law
ought to work. By preserving directors’ independence and imposing on them fiduciary
obligations that run to the firm as a whole and not to any particular team member,
corporate law reinforces and supports an essential economic role played by hierarchy in
general, and by corporate boards of directors in particular. 18

British company law academics have considered Blair and
Stout’s team production theory pretty much entirely from a normative
perspective. 19 Andrew Keay, a leading U.K.-based expert on directors’
duties, has acknowledged the theory “seeks to describe what actually
happens in the company.” 20 To this point, however, British corporate
law scholars have not used team production theory on any sort of
systematic basis to seek to explain U.K. company law rules or
governance arrangements. That is what this Article does.
While in various respects the U.K. is a promising candidate for
testing team production theory, those with at least a passing familiarity
with U.K. corporate governance might wonder if the team production
model is being set up to fail with a British case study. “[T]he UK legal
regime” is widely thought of as “an ideal playground for shareholders.” 21
Paul Davies, a leading U.K. academic company lawyer, has referred to
“the pervasive, dominant role of shareholders, who constitute the
company in UK law” and to “a strong emphasis on shareholder
autonomy in company governance and structures.” 22 Lynn Stout herself
christened the U.K. “a shareholder paradise,” arguing that its
“[s]hareholder-friendly laws . . . may have prevented the U.K.
business sector from developing much beyond finance and
commodities extraction.” 23

18. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 289.
19. For isolated departures from the predominant trend, see infra notes 89, 93, and
accompanying text.
20. ANDREW KEAY, THE CORPORATE OBJECTIVE 230 (2011).
21. Vincenzo Bavoso, The Global Financial Crisis, the Pervasive Resilience of Shareholder
Value and the Unfulfilled Promise of Anglo-American Corporate Law, 6 INT’L CO. & COM. L. REV.
213, 215 (2014).
22. Paul Davies & Jonathan Rickford, An Introduction to the New UK Companies Act, 5 EUR.
CO. & FIN. L. REV. 48, 51, 53 (2008).
23. LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST
HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 56, 84–85 (2012).
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Blair and Stout’s team production theory is oriented differently.
The board of directors is the fulcrum. The board, again, is supposed to
balance the interests of a corporation’s various constituencies so as to
foster the “buy in” required to sustain effective team production.
Correspondingly, boards should not be under the general control of
shareholders or any other corporate constituency. Instead, to
preclude constituency-specific rent-seeking that could undermine
beneficial team dynamics, boards should be vested with ultimate
decisionmaking authority. 24
The strong shareholder orientation of U.K. company law does
compromise to some degree the explanatory power of team production
theory in the British context. Nevertheless, a U.K. case study is a
worthwhile endeavor. For those well versed in U.K. company law, such
an exercise provides a fresh take on familiar legal concepts. For
instance, applying a presumption that boards should operate on an
autonomous, independent basis insulated from external pressure sheds
light on key corporate law topics such as directors’ duties and the
allocation of managerial authority. More broadly, a discrepancy
between “law in books” and “law in action” 25 becomes evident. A team
production-oriented case study reveals a high degree of board centrality
in U.K. corporate governance despite a legal framework that is
resolutely shareholder-friendly. This pattern in turn provides an
insight into an aspect of Blair and Stout’s work that merits more
attention even in team production theory’s American home, namely the
possibility that corporate participants can establish team productionfriendly governance arrangements through private ordering. Team
production theory, then, travels well across the waves.
The organizational structure of the Article is as follows. Parts I
and II set the scene for the U.K.-oriented case study of the team
production model that Part III provides. Part I identifies team
production theory’s essential features. Part II considers how British
company law academics have reacted to Blair and Stout’s work on team
production theory, indicating in so doing that the favorable reception
the theory has received is attributable primarily to its stakeholderfriendly implications. Part III, which forms the bulk of the article, offers
a U.K.-oriented case study of team production theory that assesses the
extent to which Blair and Stout’s model corresponds with key features
of U.K. company law and corporate governance. A brief concluding
section ties together the Article’s key themes.

24. See Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 254, 291–92.
25. Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 15 (1910).
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I. TEAM PRODUCTION THEORY – A PRÉCIS
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout’s team production theory
presupposes a corporation can be best understood as a “team of people
who enter into a complex agreement to work together for their mutual
gain.” 26 Individuals associating themselves with a company will be
anticipating they will share in the benefits flowing from “team
production.” Those who see themselves as part of a corporate “team”
will tend not to seek full contractual protection for the firm-specific
investments they incur. Instead, they will be trusting the board of their
company to act as the focal point of a “mediating hierarchy” that will
balance the interests of the corporation’s various constituencies in an
unbiased manner.
Blair and Stout advanced their version of team production
theory during an era of considerable intellectual ferment in the
corporate law and corporate governance realms in the United States.
During the 1990s, the “nexus of contracts” model of the corporation
emerged amid often-acrimonious debate as the dominant intellectual
construct in corporate law. 27 Shareholder value simultaneously moved
to the top of the managerial priority list, displacing an ethos where
many American corporate executives assumed they could and
should seek to balance the interests of stockholders and other
corporate constituencies. 28
Blair and Stout suggested in their pioneering 1999 team
production article that a corporation (or at least a publicly traded
corporation) was “not so much a ‘nexus of contracts’ (explicit or implicit)
as a ‘nexus of firm-specific investments,’ in which several different
groups . . . find it difficult to protect their contribution through explicit
contracts.” 29 Nevertheless, they acknowledged substantial continuity
with contractarian analysis. They suggested team production theory
was “consistent with the ‘nexus of contracts’ approach to understanding
corporate law” because the theory “views public corporation law as a
mechanism for filling in the gaps where team members have found
explicit contracting difficult or impossible.” 30
Unlike with the nexus of contracts approach, Blair and Stout did
not seek in their 1999 article to reconcile the team production model
26. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 278. The summary of team production theory this
paragraph provides was drawn from Brian R. Cheffins, The Trajectory of (Corporate Law)
Scholarship, 63 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 456, 485–86 (2004).
27. See Cheffins, supra note 26, at 484–85.
28. BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, THE PUBLIC COMPANY TRANSFORMED 180, 187, 247 (2018).
29. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 275.
30. Id. at 254.
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with shareholder primacy. 31 There indeed was little common ground.
Blair and Stout’s “claim [was] that directors should be viewed as
disinterested trustees charged with faithfully representing the
interests not just of shareholders, but of all team members.” 32
Correspondingly, as Blair and Stout acknowledged, their “view
challenges the shareholder primacy norm that has come to dominate
the theoretical literature.” 33
Blair and Stout pressed the case in favor of team production
theory versus shareholder primacy partly on the basis of descriptive
accuracy, saying that “fundamental and otherwise puzzling
characteristics of public corporation law can be explained as a response
to the team production problem.” 34 According to Blair and Stout, “[i]f
directors are to act as hierarchs, it is essential for them to hold the
ultimate decision-making authority within the firm and to be allowed
full discretion to represent competing interests.” 35 If there was a
constituency with rights to exercise control over the board—the
shareholders stand out as the obvious contender—that constituency
“could use its power over the board to seek rents opportunistically from
other members of the productive team, thus discouraging teamspecific investment.” 36
Blair and Stout identify various features of U.S. corporate law
that correspond with their description of boards as autonomous from
stockholders and other corporate constituencies. For instance, they say
that because under corporate law the board is “the ultimate
decisionmaking body within the firm,” the directors “are not subject to
direct control or supervision by anyone, including the firm’s
shareholders.” 37 Concomitantly, directors are trustees for the
corporation, not mere agents of the shareholders. 38 Directors in turn
owe duties to the corporation itself rather than directly to the
corporation’s shareholders. 39 Moreover, due to courts giving directors
substantial leeway when evaluating board decisionmaking, directors
31. See Brian R. Cheffins, The Team Production Model as a Paradigm, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
397, 411–12 (2015); Margaret M. Blair, Why Lynn Stout Took Up the Sword Against Share Value
Maximization, ACCT. ECON. & L., Dec. 2020, at 1, 6–7 (indicating, when summarizing her work on
team production theory with Lynn Stout, that “Lynn and I rejected shareholder value
maximization as the only goal of corporations”).
32. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 286.
33. Id. at 253.
34. Id. at 255.
35. Id. at 291–92.
36. Id. at 292.
37. Id. at 290.
38. See, e.g., id. at 256, 280–81; Blair, supra note 31, at 6 (“In widely-held corporations, boards
of directors are not, strictly speaking, ‘agents’ of shareholders.”).
39. See Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 288, 292–93.
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have “tremendous discretion to sacrifice shareholders’ interests” when
deciding what is best for their firm. 40
Blair and Stout maintain that board autonomy is sustained
despite facets of corporate law that vest shareholders with rights that
theoretically could tilt directorial priorities in a pro-shareholder
direction. 41 One example is the selection of directors. While
stockholders in American corporations have the right to elect board
members, 42 Blair and Stout maintain this power is “almost
meaningless” due to legal and practical obstacles such as the scope an
incumbent board has to use corporate resources to solicit votes by proxy
to secure backing for its nominees and rational apathy affecting widely
dispersed investors. 43 Practically speaking, Blair and Stout say, “boards
elect themselves.” 44 Moreover, while shareholders have scope under
corporate legislation to remove incumbent directors, 45 according to
Blair and Stout “the removal process is difficult at best.” 46
Derivative litigation is another example. In the United States,
shareholders are generally the only corporate participants able to
launch a derivative suit to pursue litigation on a corporation’s behalf. 47
Blair and Stout explain away this shareholder-friendly feature of
corporate law on the basis that shareholders granted standing to
pursue such an action will be litigating “on behalf of the corporation as
a whole, not as aggrieved individuals or groups.” 48 Moreover, courts,
because they only permit a shareholder “to step into the shoes of the
corporate entity and sue in its name and on its behalf” under very
limited circumstances, ensure that derivative suits only proceed when
40. Id. at 291.
41. See id. at 289 (“While in certain limited circumstances shareholders enjoy special rights
not granted to other stakeholders, these rights are merely instrumental.”).
42. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (2020).
43. See Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 310–11 (citing ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 94
(1986)).
44. Id. at 311.
45. See tit. 8, § 141(k). If a Delaware company has, as is permitted by section 141(d) of the
Delaware General Corporation Law, a classified (or “staggered”) board, shareholders’ director
removal rights will be substantially compromised because shareholders can only remove directors
for cause. See id. Classified boards used to be very popular in the United States, but most
companies have abandoned the structure due to shareholder pressure. See CHEFFINS, supra note
28, at 320, 364.
46. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 311.
47. See Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 11, at 426; CHRISTOPHER M.
BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD: THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
SHAREHOLDER POWER 59–60 (2013). Both acknowledge, though, that creditors can bring derivative
suits when a corporation is at or near insolvency. See Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra
note 11, at 426 n.59; BRUNER, supra, at 60.
48. Blair, Corporate Law as a Solution, supra note 10, at 204–05; see also Blair & Stout, supra
note 1, at 293–94.
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this “benefits not only shareholders, but other stakeholders in the
coalition as well.” 49
Blair and Stout, in offering their analysis of the “fit” between
team production theory and U.S. corporate law, concentrated on legal
doctrine as they made the case that their model was accurate
descriptively as well as normatively persuasive. They said very little
about the possibility of market actors voluntarily establishing a team
production-friendly environment. As Henry Butler and Fred
McChesney said of Blair and Stout’s work, “[b]y focusing on corporation
law, they neglect other contractual solutions.” 50 Our U.K. case study in
Part III indicates the private ordering angle merits a closer look. This
is because, to the extent that the “fit” between team production theory
and U.K. corporate arrangements is a good one, voluntary
arrangements play a central role.
While Blair and Stout have little to say directly about private
ordering, they do appear to anticipate that the creation of institutions
necessary for a team production approach (such as board discretion) has
a strong voluntary underpinning. In their Virginia Law Review article,
they expressly “locate the mediating hierarchy model of the public
corporation within the nexus of contracts tradition because in the
model, team members voluntarily choose to submit themselves to the
hierarchy as an efficient arrangement that furthers their own selfinterests.” 51 In a shorter 1999 law review article in which they
summarize the team production model’s key features, they maintain
“team members who cannot easily contract with each other over how to
divide up the gains from team production instead agree to give up
control over that decision, and over their team-specific assets, to a
‘mediating hierarchy’ dominated by the board of directors.” 52 So, it
seems private ordering has a role to play in team production theory.
Our U.K. case study indicates just how important that role can be. We
will show how private ordering moves U.K. corporate governance
markedly in a team production direction from a shareholder-friendly
legal departure point after we consider how team production theory has
been received in the United Kingdom up to this point in time.

49. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 293, 298.
50. Henry N. Butler & Fred S. McChesney, Why They Give at the Office: Shareholder Welfare
and Corporate Philanthropy in the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 84 CORNELL L. REV.
1195, 1217 (1999).
51. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 254 n.17.
52. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Team Production in Business Organizations: An
Introduction, 24 J. CORP. L. 743, 746 (1999) (emphasis added).
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II. TEAM PRODUCTION AND CORPORATE LAW THEORY IN THE UNITED
KINGDOM: THE STORY TO DATE
Team production theory has not been canvassed extensively in
U.K. corporate law scholarship, but it has been warmly received.
British corporate law academics who have turned their attention to
team production theory have rarely sought to use it to explain company
law doctrine. Instead, normative features of the team production model
have attracted attention and have proved popular. The manner in
which theorizing about company law has developed in the U.K. over the
past twenty-five or so years explains the model’s appeal.
According to Marc Moore, a leading British corporate law
scholar, “the typical English corporate (or ‘company’) lawyer has tended
to earn their crust by dwelling on the internal doctrinal logic and
minutiae of the law.” 53 Traditionally “the company law teaching
establishment’s attitude” indeed was “that theory is not important.” 54
A change in attitude was evident, however, as the 1990s were drawing
to a close, and concerns expressed that this pro-theory trend would
prove fleeting turned out to be unduly pessimistic. 55 While empirical
research would remain the exception to the rule in U.K. company law
scholarship, 56 theoretical analysis became mainstream. As a 2013 study
of the legal aspects of corporate governance and shareholder activism
suggested, “moral and societal analyses fill the pages of many current
UK journals.” 57
Given that theoretical discourse is an important feature of U.K.
company law scholarship and given the prominence of team production
analysis in the corporate theory realm, not surprisingly various British
academics have engaged with Blair and Stout’s work. The reviews have
been favorable. Blair and Stout’s team production work has been
described as “an important theoretical development” 58 yielding a
“[p]articularly notable” 59 and “interesting and important” 60 theory of
53. Marc Moore, Book Review, 74 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 370, 370 (2015) (reviewing CHRISTOPHER
M. BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD: THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF SHAREHOLDER POWER (2013)).
54. Nicholas H.D. Foster, Company Law Theory in Comparative Perspective: England and
France, 48 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 573, 573 (2000).
55. Id. at 593–94.
56. Daniel Attenborough, Empirical Insights into Corporate Contractarian Theory, 37 LEGAL
STUD. 191, 203 (2017).
57. SHUANGGE WEN, SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: LEGAL
ASPECTS, PRACTICES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 54 (2013).
58. ALAN DIGNAM & JOHN LOWRY, COMPANY LAW 401 (10th ed. 2018).
59. Martin Petrin, Reconceptualizing the Theory of the Firm—From Nature to Function, 118
PA. ST. L. REV. 1, 35 (2013).
60. KEAY, supra note 20, at 229.
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the firm. Lorraine Talbot, in a survey of “great debates” in company law,
characterizes team production theory as one of a handful of theories
deserving attention when considering the question “what is
the company?” 61
British company law academics treat team production theory as
important primarily because it “has significantly enriched the ongoing
‘shareholder versus stakeholder’ debate.” 62 Martin Petrin has said Blair
and Stout’s work “[n]otably . . . implies that the board should take into
account interests other than only those of shareholders.” 63 Talbot
assumes Blair and Stout’s work deserves attention because they
“identify labour as a key part of the team productive process that is the
company.” 64 Keay is drawn to the team production model by the fact
that under it shareholders do not have decisive control rights. Instead
“directors have ultimate power . . . in reconciling conflicts between the
various interests of team members.” 65
Given the analytical priors of theoretically inclined U.K.
academic commentators, it is not surprising they have focused on the
stakeholder implications of team production theory. Again, the U.K. is
thought to be “an ideal playground for shareholders.” 66 Reputedly, “[i]t
is a commonly agreed fact that UK companies are managed for the
ultimate interests of shareholders.” 67 The sympathies, however, of
Britain’s corporate law theoreticians lie elsewhere. There is alignment
with a “pluralist” approach to the company under which multiple
corporate constituencies are thought to merit recognition because this
should foster cooperative and productive relationships within
companies. 68 Accordingly, “theoretical writers in the UK have, by and
large, lent credence to pluralism, with a particular focus on stakeholder
significance and engagement.” 69 The team production model is assumed

61. LORRAINE TALBOT, GREAT DEBATES IN COMPANY LAW 2, 14–15 (2014).
62. MARC MOORE & MARTIN PETRIN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: LAW, REGULATION AND
THEORY 47 (2017).
63. Petrin, supra note 59, at 36.
64. TALBOT, supra note 61, at 14.
65. KEAY, supra note 20, at 229.
66. See supra note 21 and related discussion.
67. WEN, supra note 57, at 91; cf. Gelter, supra note 12, at 190–93 (describing the U.K. as an
“intermediate” case, citing the fact that Britain’s employment protection laws are more robust than
the United States’).
68. CO. L. REV. STEERING GRP., DEP’T OF TRADE & INDUS. (UK), MODERN COMPANY LAW FOR
A
COMPETITIVE
ECONOMY:
THE
STRATEGIC
FRAMEWORK,
at
vi
(1999),
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukgwa/20070603185134/http://www.dti.gov.uk/bbf/coact-2006/clr-review/page22794.html [https://perma.cc/5MW7-LHWA]; Mary Arden, Reforming the
Companies Acts - The Way Ahead, 2002 J. BUS. L. 579, 587.
69. WEN, supra note 57, at 53.
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to overlap substantially with stakeholder theory. 70 Blair and Stout’s
work has in turn been hospitably received in Britain.
The fact that the U.K. is assumed to be “a shareholder
paradise” 71 while a stakeholder orientation has been popular with
corporate law theoreticians merits brief elaboration. It is common
ground amongst U.K. academics that British company law and
corporate governance have a strong shareholder orientation, for better
or worse. 72 Shareholder-friendly laws, examples of which Part III will
canvass, help to justify the consensus. Corporate law theoreticians
assume a conscious shareholder-friendly public policy choice has
shaped U.K. company law’s pro-shareholder bias. 73 They also cite a
seemingly contractarian turn in companies legislation regarding the
status of the corporate constitution that will be canvassed in a
moment, 74 and assume in so doing a close link between contractarian
analysis and shareholder primacy.
From a contractarian perspective, shareholders in a company
constitute merely one constituency that is part of the nexus of contracts.
Correspondingly, there is no intrinsic contractarian justification for
shareholder primacy. 75 Nevertheless, contractarian scholars have
typically embraced managerial prioritization of shareholder interests.
They cite, for instance, the fact that all stakeholders should do well
when stockholders—a corporation’s core “residual claimants”—are
thriving. 76 Contractarians also defend shareholder centrality on the
basis that shareholders cannot bargain for contractual protection as

70. Andrew C. Wicks, F.A. Elmore & David Jonas, Connecting Stakeholder Theory to the Law
and Public Policy, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF STAKEHOLDER THEORY 97, 98 (Jeffrey S.
Harrison ed., 2019); see also Claudio R. Rojas, An Indeterminate Theory of Canadian Corporate
Law, 47 U.B.C. L. REV. 59, 98 (2014) (maintaining that the team production model is “rooted in
stakeholder theory”).
71. See supra note 23 and related discussion; Paddy Ireland, Limited Liability, Shareholder
Rights and the Problem of Corporate Irresponsibility, 34 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 837, 848 (2010).
72. Daniel Attenborough, How Directors Should Act When Owing Duties to the Companies’
Shareholders: Why We Need to Stop Applying Greenhalgh, 20 INT’L CO. & COM. L. REV. 339, 339
(2009) (acknowledging the consensus but maintaining the approach should change).
73. Andrew Johnston, Reforming English Company Law to Promote Sustainable Companies,
11 EUR. CO. L. 63, 63 (2014); LORRAINE TALBOT, CRITICAL COMPANY LAW 131, 157 (2d ed. 2015);
Paddy Ireland, From Lonrho to BHS: The Changing Character of Corporate Governance in
Contemporary Capitalism, 29 KING’S L.J. 3, 27 (2018).
74. See infra notes 82, 84, and related discussion. On the point that the statutory
characterization of the corporate constitution moves U.K. company law in a contractarian
direction, see KEAY, supra note 20, at 29–30; JANET DINE, THE GOVERNANCE OF CORPORATE
GROUPS 4 (Barry Rider ed., 2000); MARC T. MOORE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE SHADOW OF
THE STATE 137–40 (2013).
75. Cheffins, supra note 26, at 484.
76. Cheffins, supra note 31, at 408–09.
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effectively as other stakeholders, given the highly open-ended nature of
an investment in corporate equity. 77
Critics of the economic logic underpinning the contractarian
approach to company law abound in Britain. 78 It is also quite rare for a
U.K. company law scholar to engage in contractarian analysis or to
“advocate shareholder-oriented practices as being good economics.” 79
Various British corporate law academics nevertheless maintain that
contractarian thinking dominates in British company law circles. 80
Perhaps the prevalence of the nexus of contracts model stateside has
obscured how rarely British academics explicitly invoke a contractarian
approach. 81 The nature of the corporate constitution in U.K.
companies—the articles of incorporation and the by-laws in the case of
a U.S. corporation—is also relevant. The Companies Act 2006 (“CA
2006”) deems the corporate constitution to be a contract with the
company and its shareholders as parties. 82 The result is hardly a
conventional contract, with shareholders only being entitled to enforce
some of the terms of the corporate constitution and with amendments
being feasible even if some parties (shareholders) dissent. 83
Nevertheless, the statutory declaration that the corporate constitution
is a contract has served to give contractarian analysis prominence in
the U.K. that belies the meagre scholarly output. 84
Academic chilliness toward contractarian analysis has
reinforced receptiveness to team production theory among British
company law academics. There is awareness that team production
theory is “based on contractarian ideas.” 85 Nevertheless, the tendency
77. Id. at 409.
78. See, e.g., Attenborough, supra note 56, at 192, 194, 201; DINE, supra note 74, at 12–17;
Ewan McGaughey, Ideals of the Corporation and the Nexus of Contracts, 78 MOD. L. REV. 1057,
1060–61 (2015) (reviewing MARC T. MOORE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE SHADOW OF THE
STATE (2013)); Iris H-Y Chiu, Operationalising a Stakeholder Conception in Company Law, 10 L.
& FIN. MKTS. REV. 173, 174 (2016).
79. WEN, supra note 57, at 53.
80. Attenborough, supra note 56, at 191–92, 199–200; MOORE, supra note 74, at 62, 71–72.
81. Even those who claim that contractarian analysis predominates in Britain acknowledge
that this analytical approach is more popular in the U.S. than the U.K. See Attenborough, supra
note 56, at 199–200; Marc T. Moore, Private Ordering and Public Policy: The Paradoxical
Foundations of Corporate Contractarianism, 34 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 693, 695 (2014).
82. Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 33 (UK).
83. BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW: THEORY, STRUCTURE, AND OPERATION 456 (1997).
The shareholders can amend the corporate constitution by way of a special resolution. See
Companies Act 2006 § 21; infra note 130 and related discussion (describing special resolutions).
84. Moore, supra note 81, at 715–16; Iris H-Y Chiu, Turning Institutional Investors into
‘Stewards’: Exploring the Meaning and Objectives of ‘Stewardship,’ 66 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS.
443, 458–59 (2013).
85. MOORE & PETRIN, supra note 62, at 76. See also supra notes 29–30 and related discussion
(indicating the link between team production theory and contractarian analysis); KEAY, supra note
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amongst U.K. corporate law scholars has been to emphasize how team
production analysis differs from contractarian reasoning, to the point
where Blair and Stout’s model has been characterized in a prominent
student guide to company law as a “convincing alternative to a contracts
analysis.” 86 For instance, attention has been drawn to the fact Blair and
Stout characterize a corporation as a “nexus of firm-specific
investments” rather than a “nexus of contracts.” 87 The primary
distinctive feature emphasized, however, has been that team
production theory offers room for protection of stakeholder interests in
a way contractarian analysis generally does not. 88
Given that British company law academics have responded
favorably to team production theory and given that Blair and Stout
maintain that their model can explain key features of corporate law and
corporate governance, it might have been anticipated that British
company lawyers would have sought to test the theory’s explanatory
power in a U.K. context. Some observers have suggested that section
172 of CA 2006, which imposes a duty on directors to consider the
position of various specified corporate stakeholders as the board seeks
to promote the success of the company, reflects the mediating hierarchy
conception of the board central to team production theory. 89 Otherwise,
however, the invocation of team production theory in the U.K. has been
on a purely normative basis. The next Part of the Article departs from
the prevailing trend and assesses the extent to which team
production theory explains key features of U.K. company law and
corporate governance.
III. TEAM PRODUCTION THEORY’S EXPLANATORY POWER: A BRITISH
CASE STUDY
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout maintain that team production
theory does much to explain how corporate law is configured. 90 The
claims they have advanced in this regard have related only to the
20, at 37; Michael Galanis, Vicious Spirals in Corporate Governance: Mandatory Rules for Systemic
(Re)Balancing?, 31 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 327, 332 (2011).
86. DIGNAM & LOWRY, supra note 58, at 400.
87. See supra note 29 and related discussion; KEAY, supra note 20, at 37; Akio Otsuka,
Reforms of Corporate Governance: Competing Models and Emerging Trends in the United Kingdom
and the European Union, 14 S.C. J. INT’L. L. & BUS. 71, 80 (2017).
88. Petrin, supra note 59, at 36; Galanis, supra note 85, at 332; Simon Deakin, The Coming
Transformation of Shareholder Value, 13 CORP. GOVERNANCE 11, 12 (2005).
89. John Kong Shan Ho, Is Section 172 of the Companies Act 2006 the Guidance for CSR?, 31
CO. LAW. 207, 212 (2010); Jingchen Zhao, Promoting More Socially Responsible Corporations
Through UK Company Law After the 2008 Financial Crisis: The Turning of the Crisis Compass,
29 INT’L CO. & COM. L. REV. 275, 282 (2011).
90. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text.
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United States. 91 It appears, though, that team production theory
accounts successfully for key elements of Canadian corporate law. 92
This section considers team production theory’s explanatory power in a
British context. The analysis is by no means exhaustive, but extends
well beyond section 172 of CA 2006, the single facet of U.K. company
law where team production theory has been invoked in positive rather
than normative terms. 93
The team production theory-driven case study of U.K. company
law offered here proceeds as follows. We will consider initially the legal
personality of corporations, taking into account in so doing the fact that
Blair and Stout anticipate that team production theory is more relevant
for widely held corporations than for other types of companies. We will
turn next to the allocation of managerial authority in companies, the
doctrinal foundation for which is shareholder-focused in Britain in a
way it is not in the United States. Nevertheless, by virtue of private
ordering in U.K. companies the functional outcome—board control—is
much the same in both countries. The focus then shifts to duties that
directors owe, with particular reference to ascertaining the purposes for
which companies are supposed to be run and assessing the extent to
which the judiciary defers to the exercise of managerial discretion. We
will turn finally to powers company law vests in shareholders, in
particular the selection of directors and the launching of lawsuits by
shareholders in relation to their companies.
With respect to each of these topics, we will elaborate where
necessary on what we have already indicated Blair and Stout have to
say on point. We will combine this summary of Blair and Stout’s stance
with a brief synopsis of the law on point in the United States. Following
Blair and Stout’s lead, Delaware law will be our doctrinal departure
point, reflecting the fact that a majority of U.S. public companies are
incorporated under Delaware law. 94 Our focus then shifts with each
topic to the legal position in Britain. The discussion concludes in each
instance with a succinct assessment of the fit between the team
production model and U.K. company law. A recurring theme is that
there is a strong degree of board autonomy in practice despite a
shareholder-friendly legal regime.
91. See supra notes 9–11 and related discussion.
92. See, e.g., Ben-Ishai, supra note 12.
93. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
94. John Armour, Bernard Black & Brian R. Cheffins, Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87 IND. L.J.
1345, 1348 (2012). In Blair and Stout’s original team production article, the Delaware General
Corporation Law is the only corporate law statute cited. See Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 251 &
n.8, 276 & n.62, 281 n.74, 289 & n.90, 292 & n.99, 298 & n.118, 300 n.123, 310–11, 310 nn.163–64,
311 nn.168–70.

2021]

TEAM PRODUCTION THEORY ACROSS THE WAVES

1599

A. Nature of the Company
1. Blair and Stout/U.S. Corporate Law
In the United States, incorporated entities are vested formally
with legal personality. 95 Contractarians, for their part, tend to treat the
corporate entity as a mere “legal fiction” of minimal analytical
significance. 96 Despite team production theory being located within the
nexus of contracts tradition, 97 Blair and Stout take a different
approach, with corporate personality featuring as part of the theory.
Blair and Stout only addressed the point briefly in the 1999 article
where they introduced the team production model, indicating in so
doing that the corporate entity fosters team production by serving as a
repository for returns a team generates until distribution by the board
of directors. 98 They elaborated in a 2006 paper, arguing that vesting
ownership of an enterprise’s assets in a corporation under the control
of the board rather than in the hands of the shareholders encourages
firm-specific investments by other corporate constituencies because
these stakeholders will deduce opportunistic asset extraction is less
likely to occur. 99
The nature of the corporate intermediary is relevant in another
way to team production theory. Blair and Stout acknowledge that the
theory’s explanatory power varies depending on the type of company
involved. They say “the model applies primarily to public—not
private—corporations,” and single out “public corporations with widely
dispersed share ownership” as ones where directors are “remarkably
free from the direct control of any of the groups that make up the
corporate ‘team,’ including shareholders, executives, and employees.” 100
They reason that, with firms where a single shareholder or group of
shareholders dominates, the directors will have to pay heed to
concentrated voting power and thus will struggle to function effectively
as mediating hierarchs in the manner team production theory
hypothesizes. 101 The domain within which the theory is instructive is

95. ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 15, 17 (1986).
96. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976).
97. Supra note 30 and related discussion.
98. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 269, 292.
99. Blair & Stout, Specific Investment, supra note 11, at 740.
100. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 281.
101. Id. at 281, 309.
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correspondingly circumscribed. 102 Blair and Stout did not see this as a
major limitation when they introduced team production theory because
when they were doing so publicly traded companies dominated
America’s corporate economy. 103 In today’s corporate America, public
companies—the majority of which have dispersed share ownership—
remain at the forefront, and this should remain the case for the
foreseeable future. 104
2. United Kingdom
A team production theory caveat that the theory’s utility is open
to question unless public companies with dispersed share ownership are
involved would be crucial in a country with few public firms or in a
jurisdiction such as Canada where publicly traded firms often have
dominant shareholders. 105 The situation is different in the U.K. A
divorce of ownership and control has been something of an “obsession”
in corporate governance terms, with publicly traded companies having
long been a crucial element of the British corporate economy and with
diffuse share ownership having been the norm in such firms for
decades. 106 Correspondingly, ownership structure does not limit the
applicability of team production theory in the U.K.
With respect to corporate personality, the U.K. similarly falls
into line with Blair and Stout’s team production analysis. According to
case law precepts, companies are not agents for their shareholders. 107
Instead, a company has full legal personality distinct from its
“members,” the label U.K. companies legislation uses when referring to
shareholders. 108 This was put beyond doubt in the 1890s by the House
of Lords in Salomon v. A Salomon & Co. Ltd., “arguably the most
significant and famous case in corporate law.” 109 Even the smallest
102. John C. Coates IV, Measuring the Domain of Mediating Hierarchy: How Contestable Are
U.S. Public Corporations?, 24 J. CORP. L. 837, 840–42 (1999); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director
Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 596 (2003).
103. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 256.
104. Brian R. Cheffins, Rumours of the Death of the American Public Company Are Greatly
Exaggerated, 40 CO. LAW. 4, 16–22 (2019); Brian R. Cheffins, The Rise and Fall (?) of the BerleMeans Corporation, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV 445, 482–98 (2019); Margaret M. Blair, Are Publicly
Traded Corporations Disappearing?, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 642–43 (2020).
105. Gelter, supra note 12, at 154; Rojas, supra note 70, at 101–02.
106. BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: BRITISH BUSINESS
TRANSFORMED 1, 14–16 (2008).
107. Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co. Ltd. v. Cuninghame [1906] 2 Ch. 34.
108. SARAH WORTHINGTON, SEALY & WORTHINGTON’S TEXT, CASES, & MATERIALS IN COMPANY
LAW 2 (11th ed. 2016).
109. [1896] UKHL 1, [1897] AC 22; Ernest Lim, Of ‘Landmark’ or ‘Leading’ Cases: Salomon’s
Challenge, 41 J.L. & SOC’Y. 523, 524–25 (2014).
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private “one-person” corporation (as in Salomon) can contract and own
property in its own right; shareholders have no proprietary rights in
corporate assets. 110 English courts, moreover, have historically been
less inclined to disregard corporate personality than their
American counterparts. 111
B. Allocation of Managerial Control
1. Blair and Stout/U.S. Corporate Law
While the treatment of corporate personality under U.K.
company law accords with Blair and Stout’s team production theory,
the situation appears to be much different with the allocation of
managerial authority. The board of directors, functioning as a
mediating hierarch, is the fulcrum of the corporation under team
production theory. The board accordingly must be vested with the
power to manage. As Blair and Stout say of the “internal hierarchy
whose job is to coordinate the activities of the team members,” at the
peak “sits a board of directors whose authority over the use of corporate
assets is virtually absolute.” 112 The law in the United States conforms
to this pattern. Blair and Stout cite section 141 of the Delaware General
Corporation Law to make the point that the allocation of managerial
control to the board “is a defining feature of American corporate law.” 113
2. United Kingdom
In the U.K., the principal piece of legislation governing
companies, including publicly traded corporations, is CA 2006. At 1300
sections, this statute was the longest law on the U.K. statute book when
it was enacted. 114 Despite this, the legislation’s treatment of directors
is far from comprehensive. 115 Every corporation is required to have
directors. 116 The Act also does much to codify duties that directors owe,
110. Macaura v. N. Assurance Co. [1925] AC 619, 626; Andrew Keay, Shareholder Primacy in
Corporate Law: Can It Survive? Should It Survive?, 7 EUR. CO. & FIN. L. REV. 369, 394 (2010).
111. Alan Dignam & Peter B. Oh, Disregarding the Salomon Principle: An Empirical Analysis,
1885-2014, 39 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 16, 18, 27 (2018).
112. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 251.
113. Id.
114. Michael O’Dwyer, Have Governance Gripes and a Rise in Red Tape Driven Companies
Away
from
the
UK
Market?,
TELEGRAPH
(Jan.
4,
2020,
6:00
AM),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2020/01/04/have-governance-gripes-rise-red-tape-drivencompanies-away-uk/ [https://perma.cc/RA37-UQTY].
115. PAUL L. DAVIES & SARAH WORTHINGTON, PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 356, 399
(10th ed. 2016).
116. Companies Act 2006 § 154.
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terrain covered by common law principles in the United States. 117
Strikingly, though, there is no provision equivalent to section 141 of the
Delaware General Corporation Law from which it is possible to draw
general conclusions about the role of directors as mediating hierarchs.
Instead, the allocation of managerial authority to boards is a matter
dealt with in the corporate constitution of individual companies, the key
element of which is the set of internal ground rules laid down in a
document known as the articles of association. 118
Unlike in the United States, where statutes such as the
Delaware General Corporation Law give the board of directors a
substantial role in dictating the content of the corporate constitution, 119
CA 2006 vests the shareholders with exclusive power to amend the
articles of association. 120 Correspondingly, in contrast with the position
in the United States, in the U.K. the allocation of managerial power is
entirely a matter for the shareholders. Nevertheless, the ultimate
outcome is very similar. It is the universal practice in U.K. public
companies for the articles to allocate the power to run the company to
the board. 121 Shareholders thus choose to give boards the same
managerial powers that Blair and Stout say are essential for boards to
act as mediating hierarchs.
When shareholders voluntarily bestow managerial authority on
the board, case law reinforces board centrality. Where the corporate
constitution of a U.K. company vests the directors with responsibility
to manage the company, the relevant jurisprudence establishes a basic
principle of non-interference—“they and they alone can exercise [those]
powers.” 122 Hence, even though it is the shareholders who give boards
managerial authority via the articles of association, boards are
117. Id. §§ 171–77. For a comparison of these provisions with the law in the United States, see
David W. Giattino, Curbing Rent-Seeking by Activist Shareholders: The British Approach, 25
TEMP. INT’L. & COMPAR. L.J. 103, 107–17, 122–34 (2011). Various other provisions in the
Companies Act 2006 also regulate conduct of directors. See, for example, sections 190–96, which
deal with substantial related party transactions, and section 437, which requires directors to
present annual accounts and various reports to the shareholders.
118. Companies Act 2006 § 17; BRENDA HANNIGAN, COMPANY LAW 97 (5th ed. 2018).
119. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109 (2020).
120. Companies Act 2006 § 21.
121. Kym Sheehan, Shareholder Directions and FTSE100 Directors’ General Powers to
Manage the Company and Its Business 10 (Jan. 29, 2018) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3112972
[https://perma.cc/MSY7-MEFH]
(finding that in a study of the articles of association of 94 constituents of the FTSE 100, a stock
market index comprising the largest companies traded on the London Stock Exchange, all 94
companies vested managerial authority in the hands of the board). The same practice is almost
universal in private companies as well. See Jonathan Hardman, Articles of Association in UK
Private Companies: An Empirical Leximetric Study, 22 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 517, 532–39 (2021).
122. Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltd. v. Shaw [1935] 2 KB 113, 134; see also Scott v. Scott [1943] 1
All ER 582, 584–85.
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insulated in the ordinary course from the shareholders in a manner
similar to what would be expected if directors are going to act as
mediating hierarchs. For instance, in Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter
Syndicate v Cuninghame 123 the English Court of Appeal ruled that the
board could ignore an “ordinary” resolution (a resolution passed by a
simple majority of shareholder votes cast) 124 purporting to instruct the
board what to do. This followed on from the fact that “by the consensus
of [ ] the individuals within the company,” a company’s directors are
agents of the company rather than agents of the shareholders. 125
While shareholders in U.K. companies vest boards with the
managerial power associated with mediating hierarchs, U.K. company
law does not conform fully with team production theory on this count.
For instance, CA 2006 provides in various prescribed circumstances for
shareholder veto rights that potentially compromise board autonomy.
These include “substantial property transactions” where a director is a
party, 126 reductions in share capital, 127 share buy-backs, 128 and political
donations. 129 Moreover, it is standard practice for the articles of publicly
traded companies to authorize shareholders to “direct,” “regulate,” or
“influence” the board, typically by way of a “special” resolution that
must be passed by a three-quarters majority vote. 130
It has been suggested that if a company’s articles of association
authorize the shareholders to issue directions to the board, the
company, “with its board powers neutered, would be closer in form to
an incorporated partnership than a corporation.” 131 In fact, shareholder
instruction provisions in the articles of association are largely
irrelevant in practice. Shareholder proposals are a rare phenomenon in
U.K. public companies, 132 and resolutions purporting to instruct boards
123. [1906] 2 Ch. 34.
124. Companies Act 2006 § 282.
125. Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co. Ltd. v. Cuninghame [1906] 2 Ch. 34.
126. Companies Act 2006 §§ 190–96.
127. Id. § 641.
128. Id. § 694.
129. Id. § 366. For other examples, see DAVIES & WORTHINGTON, supra note 115, at 364.
130. Companies Act 2006 § 283 (defining “special” resolution); The Companies (Model Articles)
Regulations 2008, SI 2008/3229, sch. 3, pt. 2, ¶ 4 (UK); Sheehan, supra note 121, at 10 (finding
that only three of the 94 FTSE 100 companies studied made no provision for shareholder
directions, and of the 91 companies that did offer this option, 80 required the passage of a special
resolution).
131. Susan Watson, The Significance of the Source of the Powers of Boards of Directors in UK
Company Law, 6 J. BUS. L. 597, 612 (2011).
132. Suren Gomstian, Voting Engagement by Large Institutional Investors, 45 J. CORP. L. 659,
685–86 (2020) (finding that among more than 10,500 resolutions put before shareholders in FTSE
100 companies between 2013 and 2017, only 13 were shareholder proposals); Bonnie G. Buchanan,
Jeffry M. Netter, Annette B. Poulsen & Tina Yang, Shareholder Proposal Rules and Practice:
Evidence from a Comparison of the United States and United Kingdom, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 739, 743,
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are merely a subset of proposals advanced. It is also pertinent that the
institutional investors that dominate share registers of U.K. public
companies
only
exceptionally
depart
from
managerial
recommendations on how to vote. 133 By virtue of this voting pattern, a
shareholder resolution instructing the board is only likely to be
supported by the requisite majority—again typically three-quarters—if
the board itself endorses the resolution, as happened in a small number
of prominent U.K. public companies in the mid-2010s with resolutions
dealing with climate change-related risk management. 134
Ultimately, then, the allocation of managerial authority in U.K.
public companies resembles that predicted by the team production
model despite the legal departure point being fundamentally different
than it is in the United States. This degree of board centrality is largely
due to private ordering, with shareholders voluntarily vesting boards
with managerial prerogatives. The pattern dovetails neatly with the
contractarian foundations of team production theory Blair and Stout
themselves identified. 135 Of course, we are only highlighting one feature
of U.K. corporate governance here, and it would be inappropriate to
draw broadly based conclusions about shareholders voluntarily
submitting to the full force of the team production approach.
Nevertheless, a U.K. case study of the team production model would be
seriously incomplete without bearing private ordering in mind.
C. Corporate Purpose
1. Blair and Stout/U.S. Corporate Law
From the late twentieth century through to the present day,
creating shareholder value has been widely recognized as the primary
goal of American public companies. 136 For Blair and Stout, this
shareholder primacy mindset is anathema. 137 Under team production
theory, a corporation’s board acts as the ultimate arbiter in a mediating
hierarchy that pursues mutual gain on behalf of team members so as to

759–60, 762, 767 (2012) (reporting that 496 shareholder proposals were submitted to U.K. public
companies between 2000 and 2006 but indicating that only 85 companies were affected because of
substantial clustering with the submission of proposals).
133. Gomstian, supra note 132, at 666, 687–89 (finding that asset managers, who dictate how
shares owned by institutional investors are voted, supported management recommendations with
nearly 98 percent of all resolutions put forward in FTSE 100 companies between 2013 and 2017).
134. Sheehan, supra note 121, at 1.
135. See supra note 30 and related discussion.
136. CHEFFINS, supra note 28, at 367–68.
137. See supra notes 31–33 and related discussion.
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foster the firm-specific investments essential for corporate success. 138 A
board operating in this manner will seek to balance competing interests
to ensure a potentially productive coalition of team members realizes
its potential. 139 To that end, directors should forego consistently
privileging any corporate constituency, whether the shareholders or
otherwise. A board should instead aim “to protect the enterprise-specific
investments of all the members of the corporate ‘team,’ including
shareholders, managers, rank and file employees, and possibly other
groups, such as creditors.” 140 Accordingly, directors’ duties should “run
to the firm as a whole and not to any particular team member.” 141
As Blair has acknowledged, recently Delaware courts have on
various occasions seemed “to endorse the share value maximizing
norm” 142 and sought “to tie directors’ hands more tightly to the task of
acting for the sole benefit of common shareholders.” 143 This trend casts
doubt on the present-day veracity of Blair and Stout’s claim in their
pioneering 1999 team production article “that directors’ fiduciary duties
to ‘the corporate enterprise’ go beyond a simple duty to maximize
shareholder wealth, and encompass the interests of a variety of other
corporate constituencies.” 144 Otherwise, though, it remains the case, as
Blair and Stout have maintained, that in the United States a
corporation’s directors are trustees of the corporation, not agents of the
shareholders. 145 Similarly, as Blair and Stout suggest should be the
case, directors’ duties are owed in the main to the corporation rather
than to the shareholders. 146

138. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 278–79.
139. Id. at 280–81; see also supra note 18 and accompanying text.
140. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 253. Blair and Stout subsequently indicated boards should
take into account “essentially any group that bears significant risks or makes significant firmspecific investments,” which could include the local community. Blair & Stout, Director
Accountability, supra note 11, at 445.
141. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 289.
142. Blair, What Must Corporate Directors Do?, supra note 11, at 13.
143. Blair, Mediating Hierarchs, supra note 11, at 331 (citing In re Trados, Inc. S’holder Litig.
(Trados I), No. 1512-CC, 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 128 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2009)); see also eBay Domestic
Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010) (holding that directors are bound to
“promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders”).
144. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 296; see also supra note 40 and related discussion.
145. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 256, 280–81, 288, 290–91; Blair, What Must Corporate
Directors Do?, supra note 11, at 9.
146. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 288, 292–93; Millon, supra note 4, at 79; Blair, What Must
Corporate Directors Do?, supra note 11, at 5, 10; Luh Luh Lan & Loizos Heracleous, Rethinking
Agency Theory: The View From Law, 35 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 294, 302 (2010).
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2. United Kingdom
As is the case in the United States, in the United Kingdom the
corporate purpose picture is a mixed one from a team production angle.
There are features of company law that align with team production
theory in the manner Blair and Stout say is the case in the United
States. There are, however, also legal doctrines specifically directed
toward boardroom priorities that encompass a stronger shareholder
orientation than team production theory would predict.
In the U.K., like in the United States, the position of directors
has been analogized to that of “trustees” managing the corporation on
behalf of others, following on from the proposition that directors are
fiduciaries in relation to corporate assets in the same way that trustees
are fiduciaries with respect to trust property. 147 The analogy, however,
between directors and trustees is not a perfect one. There is general
awareness in the U.K. that while trustees must prioritize preservation
of the trust property and avoid risk-taking accordingly, directors of
companies operating as commercial ventures should not eschew risk as
such but should instead decide from a business perspective which risks
are worth taking. 148 Indeed, while Delaware courts tend to classify all
duties that directors owe to the company as fiduciary in nature, U.K.
courts only treat duties encompassed by what is known as the duty of
loyalty in the United States as fiduciary. 149
As team production theory suggests should be the case, directors
of U.K. companies owe their duties to their companies as legal entities
and not to shareholders. The CA 2006 codifies the common law position
on this. 150 Correspondingly, shareholders usually lack standing to sue
for breaches of duty by directors. 151 A shareholder can apply to obtain
leave from the court to sue on a company’s behalf by way of a derivative
suit but, as will be discussed, such proceedings are rarities in U.K.
public companies. 152 Directors can also owe duties to individual

147. L.S. Sealy, The Director as Trustee, 25 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 83, 83–86 (1967) (summarizing
the authorities on point without endorsing the view advanced).
148. Id. at 89.
149. Matthew Conaglen, Interaction Between Statutory and General Law Duties Concerning
Company Director Conflicts, 31 CO. & SEC. L.J. 403, 405 (2013); Jennifer G. Hill & Matthew
Conaglen, Directors’ Duties and Legal Safe Harbours: A Comparative Analysis, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW 305, 307–08 (D.G. Smith & Andrew S. Gold eds., 2018).
150. Companies Act 2006 § 170(1); see also Percival v. Wright [1902] 2 Ch. 421, 423–25.
151. Foss v. Harbottle (1843) 67 Eng. Rep. 189; 2 Hare 461; HANNIGAN, supra note 118, at 549.
152. See infra note 248 and accompanying text.
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shareholders due to “a special factual relationship,” but this is unlikely
to occur unless a closely held company is involved. 153
With U.K. company law rules bearing upon corporate purpose,
section 172(1) of CA 2006 merits particular scrutiny. The duty to
promote the success of the company this measure provides for divides
into two parts. The first obliges a director to “act in the way he
considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of
the company for the benefit of its members as a whole.” The second part
of the section 172(1) duty requires that in “[promoting] the success of
the company for the benefit of its members as a whole” directors “have
regard (amongst other matters) to” a list of interests set out in the
remainder of the subsection. These include some very general, though
from a team production perspective potentially promising, matters.
Directors are required to have regard to “the impact of the company’s
operations on the community and the environment,” “the need to foster
the company’s business relationships with suppliers, customers and
others,” “the interests of the company’s employees,” and the “long term”
consequences of business decisions, as well as the need to “act fairly as
between members of the company.” 154
Introduced as part of the codification of directors’ duties by CA
2006, section 172 was the first general statutory invocation to directors
of U.K. companies regarding the interests they are supposed to act in
as they manage companies. 155 Previously, common law principles
defined what constituted the company’s interests for the purposes of
directors’ duties. 156 Some verdicts on the change imply that the
codification pushed U.K. company law in a direction fundamentally at
odds with team production theory, given the model’s antipathy toward
the prioritization of shareholder interests. Reputedly, with section 172
asserting “the bald shareholder primacy norm,” 157 directors “now have
a clear and unequivocal, legally-binding mandate that shareholder
interests must take priority.” 158 This implies “UK law, perhaps
surprisingly, has gone farther in entrenching the shareholder wealth

153. DAVIES & WORTHINGTON, supra note 115, at 469; Peskin v. Anderson [2001] 1 BCLC 372,
379.
154. Companies Act 2006 §§ 172(1)(a)-(f).
155. Attenborough, supra note 72, at 345.
156. Daniel Attenborough, Misreading the Directors’ Fiduciary Duty of Good Faith, 20 J. CORP.
L. STUD. 73, 75–76 (2020).
157. Lorraine Talbot, Trying to Save the World with Company Law?: Some Problems, 36 LEGAL
STUD. 513, 515 (2016).
158. Andrew Johnston, The Shrinking Scope of CSR in UK Corporate Law, 74 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1001, 1032 (2017).
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maximization principle than US law.” 159 Section 172 in fact is not as
antithetical to team production theory as these assessments imply.
It is the first part of the duty to promote the success of the
company that underpins the argument that section 172 moved the law
in a pro-shareholder direction at odds with team production theory. The
thinking is that directors, instead of having scope to mediate between
various corporate constituencies, are compelled by section 172 to act in
the interests of members, with the obligation to “have regard to” other
matters only being relevant to the extent that fulfilling this
requirement enables the primary shareholder-oriented goal to be
fulfilled. 160 Even if this accurately characterizes what the first part of
section 172 does, it is doubtful whether this feature of section 172
changed the law markedly. The duty to promote the success of the
company is the statutory successor to a common law duty of directors
to act “bona fide . . . in the best interests of the [c]ompany.” 161 The
general consensus—contested by some 162—is that the common law
formulation of “the company” identified its interests with those of the
present and future shareholders. 163
While the enactment of the first part of section 172(1)’s duty to
promote the success of the company probably did not push the law in a
markedly pro-shareholder direction, the introduction of the second part
likely did move the law to some degree toward Blair and Stout’s boardas-mediating hierarch vision. The explicit invocation to directors to take
into account considerations in addition to the shareholders likely
enhanced board discretion, a team production-related theme the next
section of the article explores. 164 In addition, the second part of section
172(1) obliges directors to consider non-shareholder interests in a way
the common law did not, a shift congenial to a conception of boards as
mediating hierarchs.
The possibility of directors explicitly focusing on interests other
than those of the shareholders was contemplated pre-2006. Section 309
of the Companies Act 1985, which was enacted in 1980, provided a
company’s directors with scope to make decisions that favored the

159. BARNALI CHOUDHURY & MARTIN PETRIN, CORPORATE DUTIES TO THE PUBLIC 49 (2019).
160. TALBOT, supra note 73, at 141; Johnston, supra note 158, at 1031.
161. Re HLC Env’t Projects Ltd. [2013] EWHC (Ch) 2876 [2014], BCC 337, 361–63.
162. See, e.g., Attenborough, supra note 156, at 75–76; Jonathan Mukwiri, Myth of
Shareholder Primacy in English Law, 24 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 217, 229–30 (2013).
163. See, e.g., DAVIES & WORTHINGTON, supra note 115, at 502; Talbot, supra note 157, at 524;
DAVID KERSHAW, COMPANY LAW IN CONTEXT 336–37 (2d ed. 2012). Cases often cited to support the
consensus view include Greenhalgh v. Ardene Cinemas Ltd. [1946] 1 All ER 512, [1951] Ch 286
and Gaiman v. Nat’l Ass’n for Mental Health [1971] Ch 317.
164. Infra note 188–194 and related discussion.
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company’s employees at the shareholders’ expense. 165 More broadly,
Norse L.J. of the English Court of Appeal suggested in a 1987 case “[t]he
interests of a company, [as] an artificial person, cannot be [separated]
from [those] . . . who are interested in it,” implying scope for the
potential recognition of a range of corporate constituencies. 166 Soon
thereafter the courts confirmed that when a company was insolvent or
near insolvency the interests of the company should be equated
with those of the company’s creditors, 167 a doctrine section 172(2)
specifically preserves.
While pre-2006 U.K. directors had some explicit scope to
consider non-shareholder constituencies, the second part of the section
172(1) duty to promote the success of the company deals with the issue
in a systematic fashion previously lacking. This facet of section 172(1)
was enacted to enshrine a new concept of “enlightened shareholder
value” (“ESV”) into U.K. law. 168 The intention, according to a company
law academic closely involved in the law reform process, was to prompt
a “shift in emphasis in managerial objectives” that gave “support to the
idea that shareholder returns should be viewed as the result of running
a successful business, rather than an end to be maximized directly.” 169
The obvious criticism of the ESV aspects of the section 172(1)
duty, at least from the perspective of a communitarian approach to
corporate law, is that directors are not specifically authorized to
privilege stakeholder groups other than shareholders so as to run firms
consistent with principles of social democracy. 170 From a team
production perspective, however, this would not have been anticipated.
Team production is not about directors favoring one corporate
constituency and subordinating others but rather is oriented around
boards mediating between different groups to corporate advantage. 171
The second part of section 172(1)’s duty to promote the success of the
165. Companies Act 1985, c. 6, § 309 (UK); Companies Act 1980, c. 22, § 46(1) (UK).
166. Brady v. Brady [1988] BCLC 20, 40.
167. W. Mercia Safetywear Ltd. v. Dodd [1988] BCLC 250, 252–53; Colin Gwyer & Assocs. Ltd.
v. London Wharf (Limehouse) Ltd. [2003] 2 BCLC 153, 178; Re MDA Inv. Mgmt. Ltd. [2004] 1
BCLC 217.
168. Companies Act 2006, Explanatory Notes ¶ 325.
169. John Parkinson, Models of the Company and the Employment Relationship, 41 BRIT. J.
INDUS. RELS. 481, 503 (2003). Parkinson was a member of a government-sponsored steering group
that did much to influence the drafting of CA 2006.
170. Lorraine E. Talbot, A Contextual Analysis of the Demise of the Doctrine of Ultra Vires in
English Company Law and the Rhetoric and Reality of Enlightened Shareholders, 30 CO. LAW.
323, 327 (2009); Brenda Hannigan, Board Failures in the Financial Crisis: Tinkering with Codes
and the Need for Wider Corporate Governance Reforms: Part 2, 33 CO. LAW. 35, 39–40 (2012);
Andrew Keay, Having Regard for Stakeholders in Practising Enlightened Shareholder Value, 19
OXFORD U. COMMONWEALTH L.J. 118, 124–26 (2019).
171. See supra notes 18, 24, and related discussion.
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company can be commended at least partly from this perspective
because it requires directors who continue to be obliged to prioritize
shareholder interests to at least take into account a wide range of
specified constituencies.
D. Board Discretion
1. Blair and Stout/U.S. Corporate Law
Blair and Stout, in analogizing directors to trustees, have done
so to emphasize the independence of boards from external influence as
well as to make the case board members are not agents of the
shareholders. 172 Board autonomy indeed is a key team production
model theme. As will be discussed in Section III.E, Blair and Stout have
argued directors should be insulated from direct control by
shareholders or any other corporate constituency so as to ensure boards
have the final say over how companies are managed. In addition, Blair
and Stout say, the judiciary should give boards a wide berth so as to
leave directors substantial scope to run their companies. We address
this board discretion theme here.
According to Blair and Stout, with challenges to the exercise of
powers by directors, the default setting for the courts should be
deference to the board. 173 Judicial forbearance should extend in
particular to giving boards substantial latitude to favor particular
constituencies at the expense of others. Blair and Stout reason that
when the judiciary gives boards substantial room to maneuver this
fosters confidence directors will run their firms in the team-oriented
way that is congenial to corporate success, thereby fostering firmspecific investments that will reinforce the process. 174
Blair and Stout have argued that U.S. corporate law aligns with
their conception of boards, saying “directors of public corporations enjoy
remarkable discretion in deciding how corporate assets should be used
and how corporate surpluses should be distributed.” 175 They draw on
the business judgment rule to make their case. As Blair and Stout point
out, by virtue of this doctrine, American courts will not second-guess
decisions by directors operating on an informed basis who have acted in
good faith and honestly believed actions taken were in the company’s
best interests. 176 According to Blair and Stout, one byproduct of this sort
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

See supra notes 37–40, 145, and accompanying text.
Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 284–85.
Id. at 305.
Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 11, at 434.
Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 300.
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of judicial deference to boards is that a duty of care American directors
owe to their companies has been “all but eviscerated.” 177 Blair and Stout
maintain the outcome is congruent with the team production model
because it means a claim for a breach of this duty is only ever likely to
succeed on the rare occasions where a finding of liability would serve
the collective interests of all corporate constituencies, not just
the shareholders. 178
Directors of American companies owe a duty of loyalty as well as
a duty of care. Blair and Stout acknowledge the duty of loyalty imposes
constraints on “obvious self-dealing or takings of corporate
opportunities,” meaning it is difficult for directors “to extract any
monetary gain from their position with the firm beyond their agreedupon compensation.” 179 Blair and Stout maintain, however, that
limitations on this duty’s operation mean the courts usually give
directors a wide berth. In making this point, Blair and Stout focus in
particular on what they call “mixed motive” situations where the
exercise of corporate powers simultaneously confers upon directors
“nonmonetary benefits, such as an increase in their own authority,
security of position, and quality of life.” 180 Blair and Stout say that with
these “mixed motive” scenarios the business judgment rule should offer
protection because the directors will often be generating benefits for
corporate stakeholders, likely at the expense of shareholders. 181 Giving
directors a free pass under such circumstances is congruent with the
team production model because directors who are permitted “to sacrifice
shareholder wealth in this fashion . . . may serve the interests of the
corporate coalition even though it allows directors to serve their own
nonmonetary interests.” 182
2. United Kingdom
When the U.K. codified directors’ duties by way of CA 2006, no
attempt was made to introduce a U.S.-style business judgment rule in
statutory form. Correspondingly, it is not possible to point to a
legislative provision directing courts to grant substantial leeway to
directors of U.K. corporations in mixed motive scenarios or breach of

177. Id. at 299.
178. Id. at 300.
179. Id. at 306. They subsequently described the duty of loyalty in even more circumscribed
terms, saying “the duty of loyalty works primarily to prevent directors from indulging in more
blatant forms of theft.” Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 11, at 427.
180. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 306.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 307.

1612

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:6:1583

duty cases more generally. 183 The absence of a statutory business
judgment rule does not mean, however, that the judiciary will freely
second-guess business decisions. Instead, there is a venerable tradition
of judicial deference to business judgment evident in case law decisions
that indicate English courts are reluctant to adjudicate in relation to
the manner in which companies are run.
The reticence of the English judiciary to second-guess business
decisions was described in 1902 in Burland v. Earle by Lord Davey as
“an elementary principle of the law relating to joint stock companies
that the court will not interfere with the internal management of
companies acting within their powers.” 184 In making this point he said
he was reiterating an aversion courts had to “[m]anag[ing] every
[p]layhouse and [b]rewhouse in the Kingdom,” evident nearly a century
earlier. 185 Later in the twentieth century the English judiciary made it
clear courts would not “act as a kind of supervisory board over decisions
within the powers of management honestly arrived at” 186 and
acknowledged directors of troubled companies should not be judged too
harshly using hindsight because the directors of such firms
understandably tend to “cling to hope.” 187
The manner in which the section 172 duty to promote the success
of the company is framed is consistent with the judicial bias in favor of
directorial discretion. This provision does not require directors as such
to promote the success of the company for the benefit of shareholders.
Instead, section 172(1) obliges a director to “act in [a] way he considers,
in good faith, [is] most likely to promote the success of the company”
(emphasis added). The subjective orientation of the duty reflects the
common law. 188 As Lord Greene said in reference to the common law
duty of directors to act in the best interests of their companies, “[t]hey
must exercise their discretion bona fide in what they consider—not
what the court considers—is the interests of the company.” 189
Under the common law, due to the subjective nature of the duty
to act in the company’s best interests, directors had considerable scope
to prioritize non-shareholder constituencies. Bowen L.J. captured the
point vividly in an 1883 case, saying of the scope directors had to look
after employees so long as this was being done with the company in
mind, “[t]he law [is] not . . . that there [shall] be no cakes and ale, but
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

KERSHAW, supra note 163, at 474.
[1902] AC 83, 93.
Carlen v. Drury (1812) 35 ER 61, 62; 1 Vesey & Beames 154.
Howard Smith v. Ampol Petroleum [1974] AC 821, 832.
Re C.U. Fittings Ltd. (1989) 5 BCC 210, 213.
Re HLC Env’t Projects Ltd. [2014] BCC 337, 362–63.
Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd. [1942] Ch 304, 306.
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there are to be no cakes and ale except such as are required for the
benefit of the company.” 190 By virtue of the subjective nature of section
172, reinforced by the explicit invocation to directors to consider a broad
range of constituencies other than shareholders, this team productionfriendly formulation of directorial responsibility remains apt under
CA 2006. 191
An additional duty CA 2006 sets down reinforces the discretion
U.K. directors have to balance interests in the manner team production
theory contemplates. By virtue of section 173, directors owe to their
companies a “[d]uty to exercise independent judgment.” 192 This duty,
described at common law as a duty of directors not to “fetter their
discretion,” 193 requires that directors refrain from binding themselves
to act in a particular way in their capacity as a director without regard
to the interests of the company. One implication is that with a director
who is on a company’s board due to the sway of powerful shareholders,
the director will not owe legal duties to those shareholders that will
compromise that director’s freedom of action. 194
While the law on directors’ duties offers U.K. boards substantial
discretion in the manner team production theory would predict,
qualifications are in order. The mixed motives scenario Blair and Stout
considered appears to fall into this category. 195 Section 172’s duty to
promote the success of the company is relevant in this context because
of the possibility that boardroom decisions might simultaneously affect
the fate of the company and the personal circumstances of the directors.
Section 171(b), which requires directors to exercise their powers for
intended purposes, can also come into play because when directors
make decisions, there might be improper personally oriented purposes
combined with proper corporate ones. A breach of duty is possible under
these provisions in circumstances where directors stand to benefit
personally while taking actions they believe will advance the corporate
enterprise’s interests. Directors, for instance, have been found to be in
breach of duty under the common law equivalents to sections 171(b) and

190. Hutton v. W. Cork Ry. (1883) 23 Ch D 654, 673.
191. Luca Cerioni, The Success of the Company in S. 172(1) of the UK Companies Act 2006:
Towards an ‘Enlightened Directors’ Primacy?,’ 4 ORIGINAL L. REV. 8, 32 (2008); Deryn Fisher, The
Enlightened Shareholder: Leaving Stakeholders in the Dark—Will Section 172(1) of the Companies
Act 2006 Make Directors Consider the Impact of Their Decisions on Third Parties?, 20 INT’L CO. &
COM. L. REV. 10, 15 (2009).
192. Companies Act 2006, § 173.
193. Cabra Ests. plc v. Fulham Football Club [1994] 1 BCLC 363, 392 (citing Thorby v
Goldberg (1964) 112 CLR 597, 605–06 (Austl.)).
194. See Hawkes v. Cuddy [2010] BCC 597, 605–07.
195. See Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 306.
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172 when issuing shares so as forestall an unwelcome change of control
likely imperiling their continued service with the company. 196
An additional qualification is that, even making due allowance
for the judiciary’s reluctance to second-guess the exercise of managerial
discretion by boards, directors will not necessarily be shielded in the
event of manifest incompetence or serious inattentiveness. Risks on this
count have increased since the closing decades of the twentieth century,
a pattern confirmed by a significant increase in the number of reported
cases involving directors where the cause of action presumed a failure
to exercise meaningful business judgment. 197 This trend is partly
explained by substantial growth in the number of companies that have
been liquidated, the circumstance where the competence and diligence
of U.K. directors is most likely to be challenged in court. 198 The fact that
reporting of case law judgments has become more assiduous over time
has also played a role. 199 In addition, though, the law relevant to
directorial competence and attentiveness has become more stringent in
various ways that have increased risks for directors.
One way in which the law governing U.K. directors has become
stricter since the late twentieth century is via a reconfiguration of the
duty of care, skill, and diligence directors owe to their company. With
this duty, which initially arose under the common law, section 174 of
CA 2006 puts in place a dual standard, obliging directors to exercise the
care and skill that could be reasonably expected of a person carrying
out their role as well as to exercise their directorial responsibilities in a
reasonably diligent manner commensurate with the particular skills
they possess. 200 This dual standard approach was first introduced
through case law in the early 1990s 201 and marked a toughening
of a duty thought to treat directors as little more than
well-meaning amateurs. 202
The tightening of common law care, skill and diligence
standards did not occur in a vacuum. U.K. insolvency law underwent
196. Hogg v. Cramphorn [1967] Ch 254, 255, 266–68; Howard Smith v. Ampol Petroleum
[1974] AC 821, 822.
197. Andrew Keay, Joan Loughrey, Terry McNulty, Francis Okanubuan & Abigail Stewart,
Business Judgment and Director Accountability: A Study of Case Law Over Time, 20 J. CORP. L.
STUD. 359, 385–86 (2020).
198. Id. at 375.
199. Id. at 373, 375, 386 (acknowledging the possibility but not exploring it in depth).
200. Companies Act 2006, § 174(2).
201. Norman v. Theodore Goddard [1992] BCC 14; Re D’Jan of London Ltd. (1994) 1 BCLC
561, 563.
202. Vanessa Finch, Company Directors: Who Cares About Skill and Care?, 55 MOD. L. REV.
179, 200–04 (1992); PAUL L. DAVIES, GOWER’S PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 642–43 (6th
ed. 1997).
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far-reaching reform in the mid-1980s, 203 with one result being
enactment of new statutory measures providing for the sanctioning of
directors of companies that entered insolvency proceedings. Directors of
such firms who had continued to operate the business when insolvency
was the obvious fate, perhaps because they had failed to remain abreast
of their company’s worsening financial position, could henceforth be
ordered under section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 to compensate
unpaid creditors on grounds of “wrongful trading.” 204 Also, by virtue of
the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, a court could
disqualify directors of insolvent companies from serving as a director in
the future on grounds of “unfitness,” with evidence of “incompetence or
negligence [to] a very marked degree” being treated by the judiciary as
a sufficient basis for such an order. 205
Due to enforcement patterns, the extent to which the toughening
of legal standards compromised directorial discretion in publicly traded
companies—again the companies Blair and Stout maintained team
production theory was primarily relevant for 206—is open to question.
Occasionally those serving as directors of insolvent public companies
are disqualified from serving as directors for a specified period of
time. 207 Lawsuits involving alleged failures by directors to exercise
meaningful business judgment are largely restricted, however, to
private companies. 208 This follows on from the fact that litigation where
damages are sought against directors of publicly traded U.K. companies
is extremely rare. 209
Even if the increased stringency of the laws applicable to
directors arguably failing to exercise business judgment with sufficient
rigor have compromised director discretion, the trend has not
necessarily moved U.K. company law away from what the team
production model would predict. With the privileging of shareholders in
companies being antithetical to team production theory, legal trends
that compromise director discretion in a shareholder-friendly direction
203. BRUCE G. CARRUTHERS & TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, RESCUING BUSINESS: THE MAKING OF
CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY LAW IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES 3 (1998).
204. Insolvency Act 1986, c. 45, § 214 (UK), originally Insolvency Act 1985, c. 65, § 15 (UK);
DAVIES, supra note 202, at 153 n.37; Re Produce Mktg. Consortium (No. 2) Ltd. [1989] BCLC 520,
521. Due to subsequent statutory amendments, wrongful trading actions can now also be brought
against directors of companies in administration. Insolvency Act 1986, § 246ZB.
205. Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, c. 46, §§ 6–9 (UK); Re Sevenoaks
Stationers (Retail) Ltd. [1991] Ch 164, 184.
206. Supra notes 100–101 and related discussion.
207. See Re Barings plc (No. 5) (2000) 1 BCLC 523; Re Queens Moat Houses plc (No. 2) (2005)
1 BCLC 136, 162.
208. Keay et al., supra note 197, at 360, 371, 386.
209. Armour et al., supra note 14, at 690.
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are highly problematic from a team production perspective. This terrain
is canvassed in the next section of the Article. The pattern is different
with respect to the tougher stance the U.K. began to take with respect
to directorial competence and attentiveness as the twentieth century
drew to a close. Sanctioning directors for failings on these counts has
been a creditor-oriented affair.
The creditor-protection orientation is most obvious with actions
under the “wrongful trading” remedy. This is creditor-focused recovery
litigation whereby a claim is brought against directors of an insolvent
company in bankruptcy proceedings on the basis they increased creditor
losses by allowing their company to trade beyond the point where they
had “reasonable grounds to believe” the company could avoid insolvent
liquidation. 210 Conduct that is harmful to corporate creditors, such as
opting to continue trading on the verge of insolvency while failing to
comply with accounting and record keeping obligations, are core
concerns as well with the director disqualification regime introduced in
the mid-1980s. 211 This is of practical significance because of the volume
of disqualification orders. Between April 2019 and April 2020, for
example, there were 1,245 successful disqualifications against directors
of U.K. corporations based on the rationale their conduct as directors
made them unfit to be involved in the management of companies. 212
Creditor protection is by no means the only policy objective
underpinning the disqualification regime. Given the breadth of the
“unfitness” disqualification criteria and given the large number of
individuals whose conduct is subject to review via disqualification
proceedings, there is the potential to project standards of expected
behavior across many aspects of directorial conduct. For instance, some
directors have been disqualified for employing individuals who did not
have the legal right to work in the U.K. 213 From a team production
perspective, however, the key point is that direct protection of
shareholder interests was not a priority when the U.K. cracked down in
relation to directorial competence and attentiveness. 214 Other
regulatory strategies have been deployed instead to bolster
shareholders. We consider next the extent to which shareholder rights

210. Insolvency Act 1986, §§ 214(4), 246ZB(4).
211. Re Barings plc (No. 5) [1999] 1 BCLC 433.
212. Companies House Management Information Tables 2019-20, GOV.UK (Aug. 27, 2020),
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/companies-house-management-informationtables-2019-20 [https://perma.cc/2NLM-RCUU] (access via link on webpage).
213. Sec’y of State for Bus. Innovation & Skills v. Rahman [2017] EWHC 2468 (Ch).
214. See INSOLVENCY LAW AND PRACTICE: REPORT OF THE REVIEW COMMITTEE, 1982, Cmnd.
8558, at 390–97 (UK) [hereinafter CORK REPORT].
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under U.K. company law run counter to what team production theory
would predict.
E. Shareholder Rights
1. Blair and Stout/U.S. Corporate Law
Under team production theory, the bestowal of wide discretion
on boards should not be restricted to generous ex post judicial
evaluations of directorial judgment calls. Instead, according to Blair
and Stout, the board of directors should be “largely insulated from the
direct control of any of the various economic interests that constitute
the corporation.” 215 Boards in a team production world should have an
unencumbered final say over how their companies are run, meaning
they need to be able to operate independently of the shareholders and
any other corporate constituency. 216 Correspondingly, control rights in
a corporation should not be vested in the hands of shareholders or any
other stakeholder group. Boards instead must be “the ultimate
decisionmaking body within the firm” so as to ensure that a particular
corporate constituency cannot “use its power over the board to seek
rents opportunistically from other members of the productive team,
thus discouraging team-specific investment.” 217
Blair and Stout contend that U.S. corporate law aligns with
team production theory on this count. Directors, they have said, “are
not subject to direct control or supervision by anyone, including the
firm’s shareholders.” 218 Instead, as Blair has observed, “corporate law
gives boards of directors total authority over corporations.” 219
There are shareholder-friendly doctrinal features of U.S.
corporate law that appear to be at odds with Blair and Stout’s
characterization of public company governance arrangements. For
instance, shareholders have substantial scope to select directors and
exclusive standing to launch derivative litigation. 220 For Blair and
Stout, however, these are mere legal niceties of limited practical
significance. 221 Substantively, then, corporate law conforms with team
production theory.

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 320.
Id. at 279; see also supra note 24 and accompanying text.
Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 291–92; see also supra note 36–37 and related discussion.
Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 290.
Blair, Corporate Law as a Solution, supra note 10, at 203.
See supra notes 42, 47 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 43–44, 48–49 and related discussion.
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2. United Kingdom
With respect to shareholder rights, Britain is sufficiently widely
known as a “shareholder-friendly” jurisdiction for Wikipedia to describe
the U.K. as “pro-shareholder . . . relative to its European and American
counterparts.” 222 To the extent Britain is a shareholder paradise the
explanatory power of a theory, such as team production, that rejects
shareholder primacy seemingly must be fundamentally compromised.
In fact, shareholder-friendly features of U.K. company law do not rule
out team production model as a source of insights. Shareholder rights
need to be properly contextualized to gauge the extent to which U.K.
company law departs from what team production theory would predict.
When the focus is on the “law in action” rather than the “law in books,”
the gap is not as substantial as it would seem.
A statutory right shareholders have under section 168 of CA
2006 to remove directors by means of a simple majority vote in a general
meeting of shareholders illustrates the importance of proper
contextualization. Section 168 has been described as the “[m]ost notable
among the shareholders’ powers of strategic intervention under UK
law.” 223 When the director removal power was introduced in 1948, 224
reputedly this “shifted ultimate control of the direction of the company
from the board (and, often, the management) to the general meeting [of
the shareholders], which came to be viewed as the ultimate controller
of the company’s assets because of its power to ‘hire and fire’
the directors.” 225
Section 168 no doubt is, in theoretical terms, a powerful
shareholder tool. 226 The mere existence of section 168 cannot
fundamentally discredit team production theory, however, in the
British context. After all, the ostensibly team production-friendly
Delaware General Corporation Law provides shareholders with a
similar director removal right. 227

222. United
Kingdom
Company
Law,
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Kingdom_company_law (last visited Sept. 27, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/7SEH-C8D6] (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Marc T. Moore, United
Kingdom: The Scope and Dynamics of Corporate Governance Regulation, in COMPARATIVE
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A FUNCTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS 913, 925 (Andreas M.
Fleckner & Klaus J. Hopt eds., 2013).
223. Moore, supra note 222, at 929.
224. Companies Act 1948, c. 38, § 184 (UK).
225. Andrew Johnston, Blanche Segrestin & Armand Hatchuel, From Balanced Enterprise to
Hostile Takeover: How the Law Forgot About Management, 39 LEGAL STUD. 75, 91 (2019).
226. DAVIES & WORTHINGTON, supra note 115, at 360, 379.
227. Supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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Despite broadly equivalent director removal rights,
shareholders minded to proceed are theoretically better positioned in
the U.K. than Delaware. Removal will always be contingent on getting
a resolution on point before the shareholders, and here U.K.
shareholders have the advantage. In addition to empowering boards to
call shareholder meetings at any time, 228 CA 2006 provides members of
a company owning at least five percent of the shares with the right to
request the calling of a shareholder meeting. 229
Shareholders lack equivalent rights to call meetings under
Delaware law. Section 211(d) of the Delaware General Corporation Law
states that the board of directors or persons authorized by the articles
of incorporation or the by-laws can call a meeting. The right of a
company’s shareholders to call a meeting is therefore dependent on the
terms of the corporate constitution. 230 The advantage that shareholders
minded to remove directors have in the U.K. seems to be more
important, however, in theory than practice in the public company
space team production theory focuses on. While Delaware companies
traditionally rarely entitled shareholders owning a designated
percentage of shares to call a shareholder meeting, such an
arrangement is now fairly common, with the ownership threshold
usually being ten or fifteen percent of the shares. 231 Also, shareholder
resolutions proposing the removal of directors are rare in publicly
traded U.K. companies. 232
The discrepancy between shareholder-oriented rules and team
production-friendly reality is evident in other areas of U.K. company
law. One is appointment of directors. As is the case with the managerial
powers of boards, CA 2006 says little about how directors are elected. 233
The matter instead is left to corporate articles of association. Annual
reelection of directors by the shareholders is nearly ubiquitous in larger

228. Companies Act 2006, § 302.
229. Companies Act 2006, § 303.
230. Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 311 n.168.
231. See Sofie Cools, Shareholder Proposals Shaking Up Shareholder Say: A Critical
Comparison of the United States and Europe, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 302, 311–
12 (Afra Afsharipour & Martin Gelter, eds., 2020).
232. See Gomstian, supra note 132, at 685 (reporting that with the tiny number of shareholder
proposals brought forward in FTSE 100 companies between 2013 and 2017—again thirteen—eight
were “director related”). Cf. Buchanan et al., supra note 132, at 770, 773 (also indicating that a
majority of shareholder resolutions are related to director removal but reporting a higher number
of resolutions).
233. See supra note 118 and related discussion; DAVIES & WORTHINGTON, supra note 115, at
367.
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publicly traded U.K. companies. 234 That might sound shareholder
friendly, but in practice directorial elections are board-driven exercises.
Blair and Stout square director election of shareholders under
Delaware law with team production theory on the basis “[b]oards elect
themselves.” 235 The election of directors is not widely different in U.K.
public companies: “[T]he nomination of a person to serve as a board
member rarely comes from the shareholders themselves. The board
nominates a person and that nomination is invariably approved by the
shareholders in general meeting.” 236 Institutional shareholders in the
U.K. will refrain from voting against board-nominated director
candidates “unless all is lost. It is a ballistic missile investors would
rather not use.” 237 Hence, consistent with Blair and Stout’s verdict for
Delaware, public company shareholders treat “director election as a
business matter that is better left to the management.” 238
The same discrepancy between “law in books” and “law in action”
is evident with rights that public company shareholders exercise on an
individual rather than a collective basis, in the form of litigation.
Section 994 of CA 2006, which has been described as “[t]he most
important shareholder remedy in practice,” 239 illustrates the point. This
provision empowers a court to grant relief to a petitioning shareholder
where a company’s affairs have been conducted in a manner that is
unfairly prejudicial to that shareholder or the interests of shareholders
generally. Only members (i.e., shareholders) can apply. 240 This
shareholder-friendly feature of U.K. company law is more important,
however, theoretically than practically, at least with publicly
traded companies.
Minority shareholders in closely held companies have frequently
relied on breaches of expectations derived from informal undertakings
and agreements to support a claim for unfair prejudice under section

234. Bobby V. Reddy, Thinking Outside the Box – Eliminating the Perniciousness of BoxTicking in the New Corporate Governance Code, 82 MOD. L. REV. 692, 715–16 (2019). The
Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008, SI 2008/3229, art. 21 (UK) for plcs provide for threeyear director terms. Pretty much full compliance with what is now Provision 18 of FINANCIAL
REPORTING COUNCIL, UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE (2018) does much to explain this
pattern. See Gomstian, supra note 132, at 696.
235. Supra note 44 and related discussion.
236. KERSHAW, supra note 163, at 246.
237. Alison Smith, Shareholders Show Restraint in Applying Voting Powers, FIN. TIMES, June
27, 2014, at 22 (quoting Sarah Wilson, chief executive of Manifest, a shareholder advisory group).
238. Gomstian, supra note 132, at 696.
239. HANNIGAN, supra note 118, at 503.
240. Companies Act 2006, §§ 994(1), 994(2) (noting the only nonmembers who can apply are
people to whom shares in a company have been transferred or transmitted by operation of law).
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994. 241 In contrast, there does not appear to have ever been a reported
case involving a publicly traded company where an unfair prejudice
petition has been successful. 242 This is partly because case law
precedent leaves minority shareholders in publicly traded companies
with very little scope to launch petitions on the basis informal
undertakings have been breached. 243 Also, the remedy most commonly
sought in section 994 proceedings—a buyout of the petitioner’s shares
at fair value 244—will have little appeal for public company shareholders
because the stock market should provide a convenient non-litigious
exit option. 245
Litigation realities similarly imply that the scope shareholders
have to bring derivative suits under U.K. company law does not draw
Britain as far away from the team production model as might be
anticipated. Consistent with the position in the United States, when the
U.K. law on derivative litigation was codified by CA 2006, the right to
bring such proceedings was allocated exclusively to shareholders. 246
The intention with codification was to make the conduct of derivative
actions simpler, more flexible, and more efficient for individual
shareholders seeking to launch such proceedings, subject to the filter of
having to convince a judge under criteria specified by statute that it
would be desirable for the particular litigation to proceed. 247
The overhaul of derivative action rules seemingly ran contrary
to what team production theory would predict because the change
increased scope for shareholder second-guessing of board decisions not
to litigate. In practice, however, in public companies any such shift has
been incremental at best. There have only been three reported cases
since the enactment of CA 2006 where a minority shareholder in a

241. Brian R. Cheffins, The Undermining of UK Corporate Governance (?), 33 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 503, 528 (2013).
242. Id. at 528–29.
243. See VICTOR JOFFE, DAVID DRAKE, GILES RICHARDSON, DANIEL LIGHTMAN & TIMOTHY
COLLINGWOOD, MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS: LAW, PRACTICE, AND PROTECTION 352–55 (6th ed.
2018).
244. Id. at 432, 437.
245. HANNIGAN, supra note 118, at 504.
246. See supra note 47 and related discussion; Companies Act 2006, § 260(1); Daniel
Attenborough, The Neoliberal (Il)legitimacy of the Duty of Loyalty, 65 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 405, 426–27
(2014). The law on this point was the same at common law as noted by JOFFE ET AL., supra note
243, at 42.
247. Companies Act 2006 §§ 260–63; DAVIES & WORTHINGTON, supra note 115, at 598; Andrew
Keay & Joan Loughery, An Assessment of the Present State of Statutory Derivative Proceedings, in
DIRECTORS’ DUTIES AND SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION IN THE WAKE OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 187,
189 (Joan Loughery ed., 2013).
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publicly traded company has sought leave to bring a derivative suit. 248
The paucity of derivative suits bears out predictions that statutory
reform would not open the door to litigation against public company
directors, given the practicalities of derivative litigation. 249 A public
company shareholder will have little incentive to bring such
proceedings because the litigation likely will be time consuming and
expensive for that shareholder and because, with recovery being the
right of the company, a successful litigant will end up no better off than
fellow “free riding” shareholders. 250 Statutory changes to derivative
litigation correspondingly have done little, if anything, to move U.K.
company law away from team production precepts in the public
company context.
CONCLUSION
At first glance, team production theory and U.K. company law
are ships passing in the night. While prioritization of shareholder
interests is antithetical to team production theory, U.K. companies
legislation reputedly betrays Britain’s “predominant faith to
shareholder primacy.” 251 In fact, as this Article indicates, examining
U.K. company law and the governance arrangements of British public
companies through the prism of team production theory illustrates that
the board centrality that is a hallmark of team production theory
features prominently in Britain. The fact that structurally “board
primacy” is a part of British as well as American corporate life has not
been entirely ignored. 252 Nevertheless, deploying team production
theory to assess key features of U.K. corporate law and governance
brings this important point fully to the fore. At the same time, a U.K.
case study draws attention to an underexplored facet of team
production theory that likely merits further analysis even in an
American context, namely the role private ordering can play in moving
governance arrangements in a team production-friendly direction.
Sticking with the American angle for the moment, the team
production driven account provided here should act as a beneficial
corrective for those in the United States seeking to draw lessons from
248. John Armour, Derivative Actions: A Framework for Decisions, 135 LAW Q. REV. 412, 427
(2019) (listing two such cases brought between 2007 and 2017); Kallakis v. AIB Group plc [2020]
EWHC 460 (Comm).
249. Brian R. Cheffins & Bernard S. Black, Outside Director Liability Across Countries, 84
TEX. L. REV. 1385, 1408 (2006).
250. Id. at 1405–07.
251. JANET DINE & MARIOS KOUTSIAS, THE NATURE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF NATIONAL CULTURAL IDENTITY 176 (2013).
252. MOORE, supra note 74, at 29.
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the U.K. Advocates of stronger rights for stockholders in American
public companies have cast envious glances across the Atlantic. 253 This
is hardly surprising when, according to a well-known American
corporate law academic, “[s]hareholders of a U.K. public
company . . . possess extraordinary power to shape the rules of
corporate governance.” 254 The team production-oriented case study
offered here suggests that in U.K. public companies the rights of
shareholders are more important in theory than in practice. A
shareholder-focused “ ‘black/white’ depiction of the U.K. and U.S.
corporate law regimes” correspondingly misses an important part of
corporate reality. 255
A similar team production-related invocation to pause before
offering broad corporate-related generalizations is appropriate on the
British side. U.K. academics have made various bold claims about the
shareholder centrality of British corporate law. For instance, it has
been said “[s]hareholders dominate UK company law.” 256 This
reputedly constitutes a victory of neoliberal thought in the corporate
and legal realms that reflects “deeply rooted cultural principles of
individualism and laissez-faire capitalism.” 257 And adverse
consequences have supposedly followed, as “the entrenched imbalance
in company law in favour of shareholders,” has fostered “many faces of
flawed capitalism which has now put into doubt the social legitimacy of
the modern corporation.” 258 Analyzing public company arrangements
through a team production prism indicates such rhetorical flourishes
should not be taken at face value. Marc Moore has said that in practice
U.K. shareholders are relegated “to the status of being subject to the
corporation and the governing mandate of its board of directors.” 259 The
team production-driven case study this Article has presented suggests
there is much to be said for this characterization of public company
governance, even if the U.K. “law in books” prioritizes shareholders to
a greater degree than American corporate law.

253. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 725
(2007).
254. BRUNER, supra note 47, at 29.
255. Moore, supra note 53, at 373.
256. Andrea Bowdren, Contextualising Short-Termism: Does the Corporate Legal Landscape
Facilitate Managerial Myopia?, 5 UNIV. COLL. LONDON J.L. & JURIS. 285, 287 (2016).
257. Marios Koutsias, Shareholder Supremacy in a Nexus of Contracts: A Nexus of Problems,
38 BUS. L. REV. 136, 139 (2017); see also Talbot, supra note 157, at 528; Attenborough, supra note
246, at 428.
258. Chiu, supra note 78, at 174.
259. Marc T. Moore & Antoine Rebérioux, Revitalizing the Institutional Roots of AngloAmerican Corporate Governance, 40 ECON. & SOC’Y 84, 100 (2011).
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Margaret Blair, with her work on team production theory, has
made a seminal contribution to debates on the American corporation.
Thus far not much has been done to deploy the team production model
internationally. 260 The U.K., given its shareholder-friendly reputation,
poses a tough test for team production thinking. The case study offered
here suggests that the model in fact may travel well, at least in relation
to the publicly traded firms it is directed toward. Similarly, the fact that
private ordering does much to explain why the U.K. is more team
production-oriented than would be anticipated from “law in books”
draws attention to an additional potential growth area for team
production theory—exploration of the extent to which parties can and
do adopt features of the model voluntarily. Margaret Blair’s already
substantial academic legacy thus may yet be burnished substantially in
both a cross-border and contractarian manner.

260. See supra note 12 and related discussion.

